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Why do people pay taxes? One obvious answer is that there are enforcement mechanism 
(fines and penalties) established by the State. This deterrence approach to tax compliance 
has been formally analyzed in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In 
this model tax payers decide whether and how much to evade taxes in the same way they 
would approach any risky decision or gamble, that is, by maximizing expected utility 
(Slemrod (2007)). Under this framework tax evasion is negatively associated with the 
probability of detection and the severity of punishment.   
 
However this view has been criticized by various authors (Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Alm 
et al., 1992; Frey and Feld, 2002) on the account that deterrence only cannot explain the 
level of tax compliance actually observed in many countries. In other words, as Andreoni, 
Erard and Feinstein (1998) have indicated, the level of detection probabilities and fines 
are too low to explain the rather low levels of tax evasion observed in developed 
economies. This has given rise to a growing literature that analyzes the importance of 
behavioral and cultural aspects in explaining taxpayer behavior (Scholz and Witte, 1989; 
Alm et al., 1992; Alm et al., 1993; 1999; Pommerehne et al., 1994; Frey 1997, 2003; Frey 
and Torgler, 2002).  
 
These other non deterrence arguments have been grouped under the broad concept of “tax 
morale”. This concept encompasses moral rules and sentiments of citizens which make 
them fulfill with their tax obligations, social norms that makes cheating on taxes an 
undesirable action when the rest of the population is complying, and a sort of reciprocity 
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response of the individual in its relation to the State in the sense that citizens will comply 
with their tax obligation when they see that the government also performs well its 
commitments in terms of delivering services and other public goods.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide experimental evidence regarding these two 
alternative forces explaining tax compliance for the case of a local business tax in the 
municipality of Sucre in Venezuela. The great advantage of experimental analysis is that 
it offers credible estimates of the causal effect of the variables of interest on tax evasion1.  
There are already various studies employing an experimental design to analysis the 
determinants of tax evasion. Nevertheless most of the existing studies (i.e. Slemrod et al 
(2001); Torgler (2004); Hasseldine et al (2007), Kleven et al 2010)) have been conducted 
in developed countries and are related to individual incomes taxes. Very few studies have 
analyzed the case of a developing country using data on business taxes2.  Given the very 
high tax evasion levels encounter in many of these countries (and Venezuela is not an 
exception in this pattern) it would be very interesting to test if these phenomena could be 
related to poor enforcement, low tax moral or a combination of both factors.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents a short review of the 
theory of tax evasion and the existing evidence on the deterrence and tax moral 
determinants. Section 3 describes the experiment implemented in Sucre and the main 




                                                             
1 The problem with no experimental studies (that mostly use macro data at the municipal/state level) is that 
even when reasonable estimates of evasion and its various determinants are available, the variation in tax 
rates and enforcement efforts is not exogenous but rather an endogenous response to compliance (Kelven et 
al (2010)). This requires the use of instrumental variables (see Beron et al (1992), Dubin et al (1990),  
Feldman and Slemrod (2007). Nevertheless, as argue in Andreoni et al (1998) and Slemrod and Yizhaki 
(2002) most of the available instruments are likely to satisfy the required exogeneity assumptions.   
2 A notable exception is the paper by Pomeraz (2010) that analyzes the case of VAT tax payments in Chile.  
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2. Conceptual framework and previous evidence 
 
2.1 Deterrence 
As indicated previously the seminal work analyzing tax evasion decision at the individual 
level is Allingham and Sandmo (1972). These authors developed a theory based on 
Becker’s (1968) analysis of criminal behavior. In their view, the declaration of income to 
be taxed is a decision under uncertainty: on the one hand, the individual can be audited 
and, if caught underreporting his income, penalized; on the other hand, he might not be 
audited, and thus escape from being taxed. Assuming a given perceived probability of 
being audited, the individual decides how much to evade such that expected utility is 
maximized. In this simple model it is easy to find that the “optimal” level of tax evasion 
declines with the probability of being audited, and with the size of the penalty.  We will 
analyze below whether the existing evidence support these basic predictions of the 
model. Yet to properly judge whether this evidence contradicts or not the theoretical 
model we have to be more precise about three aspects.  
 
First, what is the empirical counterpart of the individual income subject to taxes that the 
individual may have incentives to under-report?  In many cases this does not includes all 
the income of the individuals. In most countries wages are reported to the tax authority by 
the employer (even more, the employer already acts as tax withholding agency). So this 
part of income cannot be unreported by the employee. The same happens with income 
obtained from interest earned by financial assets which are reported to the tax authorities 
by banks. In all these cases the chances to underreport income and then to evade taxes are 
very limited. So the application of the deterrence model should be interpreted as applying 
to that part of income (or those categories of earnings) which the tax payer can in fact 
evade without certainty of detection. Thus evasion is determined very significantly by the 
“opportunity” for income misreporting (Slemrod (2001)).   
 
A second issue relates to the perceived probability of being detected or audited. How is 
this perception determined? The original paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) already 
considers the possibility that this probability is determined endogenously assuming that it 
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declines with the amount of income reported. It is shown that the results derived from the 
simple model do not change. This assumption is plausible (the higher the reported income 
the lower the suspicion of the tax agency that an illicit behavior is underway) but it may 
be better if these probability is derived from an explicit analysis of the actual policy 
followed by the tax agency.  This analysis, assuming the tax authority can commit to an 
audit rule, is provided by Reinganum and Wilde (1985). The main prediction of the 
extended model is that audit occurs with a probability equal to p* when the reported 
income is below certain threshold value while there will no inspection for reports above 
this level. The interpretation of this result should not be that rich people is not audited, 
but that given certain characteristic of the individual known by the tax authority (age, 
education, profession, past values of reported income, etc.) that helps to put the tax payer 
within a given income bracket, a low income report will most probably trigger an audit.  
 
The above model assumes very sophisticated tax payers that look into the process of how 
the tax authority determines it audit policy to derive its perception of the probability of 
being subject to an audit. Moreover in equilibrium the perceived probability equals the 
one implied by tax authority decisions. Of course in practice this is hardly the case. Alm 
et al (1992) conclude that most individuals appear to substantially overweight the 
probability of audit, resulting in greater than predicted compliance.  Fischer et al (1992) 
also provide evidence that tax payer compliance is determined by perceptions about 
detection risk rather than the actual detection rate. This perception is based on personal 
experiences, knowledge of the tax laws, professional tax advice and other demographic 
characteristics (Roth et al, 1989; Iyer et al, 2010). What is important from the point of 
view of the empirical analysis that follows is whether these perceptions can be affected 
by policy initiatives taken by tax authorities. For example, by sending letters informing 
that some aspects of the tax control policies are being strengthened by the tax 
administration.   
 
Finally, as explained above the deterrence model not only depend on the probability of 
detection but also on the level of the severity of the penalty in case an illicit behavior is 
reveled. In this regard, public intervention at improving enforcement could imply 
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increases in penalties or just increases in tax payer awareness of the existing fines in case 
a tax evasion is detected. In this regards Iyer et al (2010) mentions that, for example, in 
the case of the State of Washington (USA) most businesses were not aware of legislated 
mandatory and discretionary penalties since they were infrequently applied in the past.       
 
Various studies have applied experimental methods to analyze whether the basic 
hypothesis coming from the deterrence model are consist with actual behavior of tax 
payers.  Slemrod et al, (2001) was one of the first studies to use this type of methodology 
implementing a randomized controlled experiment conducted in the State of Minnesota in 
US, using a sample of 1700 state income tax filers.  They found that low and middle 
income tax payers who received a letter promising an audit reported slightly more income 
compare to those who did not receive that letter. The difference was larger for those tax 
payers that have greater opportunities to evade, that is, those individuals that are self-
employed or work in the agricultural sector3.  Similar evidence is obtained from 
Dinamarca by Kleven et al, (2010). These authors implemented a tax enforcement 
experiment were 40000 income tax filers were randomly chosen and half of them were 
selected for an audit. The authors find that tax evasion was very low (0.3%) for those 
income earners subject to third party reporting while it was significant (37%) for those 
whose tax payment depends mainly of self- reported income (i.e. self-employed workers 
or those working in the agriculture sector). Moreover, both having being audited and 
receiving threat-of-audit letters also increases the level of self reporting income one year 
later suggesting that both actions increase individual´s beliefs about audit probability.   
 
Evidence on the importance of third party reporting as an effective mechanism to enforce 
tax payments is also provided by the study of Pomeranz (2010).  This paper reports the 
impact of “treat of audit” letters for the case of VAT payments by firms in Chile. Tax 
authorities sent letters indicating an increase in audit probability to over 100000 
                                                             
3 Slemrod (2007) argues that the most compelling evidence in support of the Allingham and Sandmo 
deterrence model comes from cross-sectional variation in noncompliance rate across types of income.  In 
this regards in US and other countries there is a positive correlation between the rate of compliance and the 
presence of enforcement mechanism such as information reports (i.e. from banks) and employer 
withholding.   
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randomly chosen firms. While the letter generated an immediate and strong increase in 
the overall VAT payments, the effect was much weaker for transactions between firms. 
This is not surprising given that the VAT design generates incentives for enterprises to 
document purchases from their supplier while this is not the case for firms whose main 
sales go to final consumers. Thus the paper provides evidence that third party reporting, 
in this case generated by incentives built by the VAT design, can be an effective 
mechanism to enforce tax payment and to some extent replace costly auditing strategies.      
 
2.2 Tax Morale 
 
“Tax morale” usually means the self reported citizen’s perception that paying taxes is the 
right thing to do. People’s perception that paying taxes is the right thing to do is related 
with the idea that the State has some social value, so it is a citizen’s obligation to 
contribute to its financing. In the case of a tyrannical State that exploits its citizens 
without providing any services whatsoever the notion of tax morale would lose its ethical 
and political meaning. When seen from this point of view, the concept of tax morale is 
then closely related to the idea of reciprocal behavior from the individual towards the 
State. That is, according to the “reciprocity towards the government” hypothesis, people 
are more likely to pay taxes when they perceive the government is doing a better job. 
Notice that reciprocity implies a deviation from purely self-interested behavior: it “means 
that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more 
cooperative than predicted by the self-interested model” (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In the 
case of taxes one could say that the individual would be willing to pay more taxes to the 
extent that the use of these resources by the State is beneficial for him and for society as a 
whole. The departure from self-interested behavior is clear, since the individual’s 
contribution to the government’s budget is negligible and thus cannot expect to make a 
difference in the amount of goods and services received. Thus, reciprocal behavior is 
altruistic, but conditional on receiving satisfactory goods and services from the State 
(Levi, 1998; Slemrod, 2007).  
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Having argued that tax morale is very closely related to the concept of reciprocity 
towards the government, it is also worth mentioning that reciprocity has also been related 
to the notion of social norms or “societal institutions” (Bird et al., 2004) whereby the 
individual’s willingness to evade/pay taxes in part also depends on whether he perceives 
other society members comply with their tax obligations or not (Frey and Torgler, 2007). 
This may also be interpreted as reciprocal behavior towards “the fellow citizen” instead 
of towards the government. Another way to see this other dimension of tax morale is as a 
coordination problem, where even though people realize that their individual contribution 
to the State makes no difference in terms of overall government income and service 
delivery, if  most people don’t comply with taxes, government performance will be 
negatively affected, and if everyone complies, performance will improve. In this 
interpretation a high level of tax morale implicitly means a decision of most individuals 
to cooperate in the tax/expenditure game of financing the State.  
 
Finally, there may be other reasons beyond reciprocity and conditional cooperation that 
explain why people think paying taxes is the right thing to do. This may be related to 
deep moral judgment or values that are induced by religious beliefs or educational 
background, and that are unconditional on the behavior of other people or institutions. 
This concept relates to the usual measure of tax morale: whether people think tax evasion 
is morally never justifiable.  
 
The evidence on tax morale is mixed. In this regard, in the randomized field experiment 
with Minnesota tax payers described in Blumenthal et al (2001), two letters were also 
sent to investigate whether non deterrence or tax morale factors were also an important 
determinant of tax compliance. One letter tried to test the reciprocity hypothesis by 
stressing the beneficial effects of tax–funded projects. The other letter investigates the 
social norm factor informing that most tax payers were compliant.  Neither of the two 
letters had any significant effect on self-reported income compare to those tax payers that 
did not receive the written communication.   
Similar results were obtained by Torgler 2004 for the case of a controlled field 
experiment at the communal level in Switzerland analyzing the effects of moral suasion 
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on the timely paying and filling out the personal income tax form. The letter emphasized 
the reciprocity channel by pointing out the importance of paying taxes voluntary to 
guarantee the provision of public goods. The authors find that these appeals to tax moral 
arguments have hardly any effects on tax payer’s compliance behavior.   
Positive evidence on moral suasion is presented in Hasseldine et al (2007). This paper 
describes the results of a controlled field experiment applied to 7300 sole proprietors 
running small business (sales just under 15000 pounds) in United Kingdom. These small 
businesses have the opportunity to apply for a simplified format of tax reporting that 
reduce the tax payment. So this is a potentially “high opportunity” group for tax evasion. 
The authors analyze the effect of different letters. A first group of announcements were 
geared to increase the probability of audits (deterrence argument).  A second type of 
letter makes appeal to moral suasion. In the last case, the letter combined arguments 
about reciprocity (benefits of public good financed by taxes) and social norms (most 
people pay taxes). The results show an overall significant positive treatment effect for 
both types of determinants on the reported levels of sales after the reception of the written 
communication.  The enforcement letter has, nevertheless, a slighted larger impact 
compare to those appealing to tax moral arguments.           
In a similar exercise, the study by Ariel (2012) tries to test both the deterrence and tax 
morale models of tax compliance using data for incorporated and unincorporated 
businesses in Israel. The sample included around 125000 firms and the analysis focuses 
on VAT tax. Two letters were sent. One intended to increase the perceived probability of 
audit and of punishment in case irregular transactions or for not filing a tax report at all. 
A second letter has the purpose of increasing tax moral sentiments of tax payers 
emphasizing the reciprocity channel (how tax dollars were allocated to finance public 
services). The outcome variables the paper looks at were reported gross sales, tax dollars 
paid and tax deductions. Overall the study finds no statistical significant effects of either 
the sanction or the moral persuasion letters.  To some extend this result may not be 
surprising given the above discussion about how important is to consider whether tax 
payers have opportunities to conceal revenues or incomes, and how this depend on the 
presence of third-party reporting agencies or tax withholding mechanisms. In the case of 
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the VAT clearly this is the case at least for transactions between firms. As the paper by 
Pormeranz already show for Chile, deterrence letters have almost no impact on reported 
sales and tax payments for firms operating within the industrial chain (not selling to final 
consumers).     
In the next section we will show an experimental exercise applied to a business tax in 
Venezuela where results would also depend on the opportunity to evade4. 
 
3. New evidence from Venezuela 
 
3.1 Basic features of the controlled field experiment. 
  
In this section we will discuss the details of the randomized field experiment 
implemented in the Municipality of Sucre, Venezuela. This municipality is the second 
largest of the Caracas region with around one million inhabitants and a size of 
approximately 164 square kilometers.  In coordination with the Municipal Office for 
Fiscal Revenues and the Planning Department, 6.300 firms were selected to participate in 
the study. The sample represents approximately 87.5 % of the firms located in the 
municipal territory.  The analysis of tax compliance will be focused on a local business 
tax applied to the gross sales of firms belonging to the industry, service and retail sectors. 
This is an important tax for the municipality as it represents 60% of all its income from 
taxes.        
 
As in the previous studies of Blumenthal et al (2001), Hasseldine (2007) and Ariel (2011) 
we will empirically asses the relative importance of both the deterrence and tax morale 
models for explaining tax compliance. We will follow the existing literature that tries to 
induce an exogenous change in firm’s perception about tax control, on one hand, and of 
moral suasion, on the other, by randomly sending letters to different treatment groups.  
 
                                                             
4 The study by Ortega et al (2013) provides evidence on the reciprocity hypothesis for various cities in 
Latin America. They run a controlled field experiment, but they test whether reciprocal sentiments towards 
the government affect the willingness to pay taxes instead of actual tax payments.    
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We have sent 5 letters to five different groups of firms5. One letter described planned 
changes in the municipal tax administration office that would improve tax control and 
enforcement. In particular it mention the hiring of new inspectors and vehicles that will 
facilitate the implementation of audits and also the acquisition of new information and 
technology systems that will allow a more precise identification of tax payers.  Another 
letter aimed at strengthens tax moral sentiments simply stressing the importance for any 
citizen to comply with their tax obligations. Two additional letters try to investigate the 
reciprocity hypothesis. One informed about policies geared to improve the provision of 
general public goods and business services. For example, it details policies aiming at 
strengthen citizen security (police), basic infrastructure (public transportation, public 
lightening and waste management) and formal economic activity (control of illegal 
commerce). A second letter mentions initiatives regarding social assistance for the poor 
and the elderly, and improvements in public health services (more redistributive 
programs).  Finally, there was a placebo-type letter that just informed the new address of 
the tax administration office.          
 
Overall 2255 letters were distributed across the entire geography of the municipality.  
Only very peripheral areas were left outside of the analysis. Within each treatment group 
there was a balance in terms of geographical coverage. A control group of around 4200 
firms that did not receive any letter was also selected.   
 
3.2 Estimated method 
 
The official registries of the municipal tax office permits following the payment behavior 
for each individual firm in the sample. In particular the impact of the various treatments 
is going to be analyzed in terms of the difference between tax accruements and tax 
payments (tax balance) evaluated at 15  days-intervals starting from May 15 until 
September 30th (2011). This allows having 10 time observations for each firm. The letters 
were distributed between June 7th and June 25th so the way to estimate the casual effect of 
the various interventions is a simple diff in diff regression where we compare the tax 
                                                             
5 See in appendix A the actual letters that were sent to the different groups.  
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balance of each firm before and after the reception of the letters. More formally we 
estimate by OLS the following equation, 
 
Tax balancei,t = a + bi (treatment group i x t) + ei,t    ;   i=1,..5;  t=May 30
th ,...,September 30th .  
 
Tax balance is measured in terms of firm’s sales. The treatment group i variable refers to 
whether firm i received any of the 5 letters (so the category left out are the control firms 
that received no letter), while t indicated the date at which the tax balance of each firm is 
measured; ei,t is the error term.  The key identification assumption is that the error term is 
not correlated with the treatment variables. This is guaranteed by the fact that the 
different groups of firms were selected randomly. 
 
Though our methodological approach is not novel we must emphasized that we are one of 
the first studies to provide experimental evidence about the determinants of tax 
compliance for the case of a developing country. Moreover, within the experimental 
literature there are few studies that analyzed the case of business taxes. This prompted us 
to introduce in the reciprocity letter the information about public good that are relevant 
for firm operation (i.e. enforcement of illegal commerce). Finally, the introduction of a 
placebo letters tries to test whether beyond receiving a written communication from the 
tax authority, the actual text of the letter matters. People may start paying more taxes just 




Table 1 shows the results for the enforcement letter.  We present the estimation for all 





As we see, we find that firms have accelerated their tax payments after receiving the 
letter (from June 30th onwards) giving them information about new measures to improve 
tax enforcement. By August 15th, the accumulated reduction in tax obligations reached 
the equivalent of 2% of total sales for the whole sample. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
overall effect comes mainly from the impact on small firms (less than 4700 US$ in sales). 
For these firms the accumulated effect by August 15th reaches almost 4% of their sales. It 
is interesting to find that the effect of the treatment is heterogeneous affecting in greater 
proportion small firms. One interpretation of this result is that these firms where the ones 
that evade the most given their lower exposition to tax controls due to their size (“high 
opportunity firms”).  The estimated impact of the enforcement letter nevertheless seems 
to be temporal. By August 30th (two months after the reception of the announcement) the 




VARIABLES All firms Sales<4.700$ 4.700$<Sales
Enforcement*30th May -0.003 -0.005 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Enforcement*15th June -0.003 -0.005 -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Enforcement*30th June -0.007* -0.014* -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Enforcement*15th July -0.006* -0.012* -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Enforcement*30th July -0.020** -0.039** -0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Enforcement*15th August -0.020** -0.038** -0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Enforcement*30th August -0.005 -0.010 -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Enforcement*15th Sept. -0.003 -0.005 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Enforcement*30th Sept. -0.007* -0.014* 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 45,946 23,615 22,331
R-squared 0.466 0.465 0.510
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.  Tax enforcememt  
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Table 2 and 3 show the estimated effects of the reciprocity letters. Table 2 shows the 
results for the letter related to general public services and economic infrastructure   
(Reciprocity 1) while Table 3 describes that regarding social programs (Reciprocity 2). 
The results for Reciprocity 1 are similar to that of the enforcement letter though the 
magnitudes of the effects are slightly lower and the coefficients are estimated less 
precisely (10% significance level).  An interesting difference with respect to the 




On the other hand, the results for the Reciprocity 2 letter are much weaker. As we see in 




VARIABLES All firms Sales<4.700$ 4.700$<Sales
Reciprocity 1*30th May -0.003 -0.005 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 1*15th June -0.003 -0.005 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 1*30th June -0.008** -0.015** -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 1*15th July -0.007* -0.013* -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 1*30th July -0.018* -0.034* -0.004**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Reciprocity 1*15th August -0.018* -0.033* -0.004*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Reciprocity 1*30th August -0.006* -0.012* 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 1*15th Sept. -0.003* -0.006* 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Reciprocity 1*30th Sept. -0.008** -0.015** -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 45,946 23,615 22,331
R-squared 0.466 0.465 0.510
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Table 4 and 5 present the estimations results for the direct tax moral letter (simply saying 
that paying taxes is a citizen obligation) and the placebo, respectively. As we see, in 
comparison with the Enforcement and Reciprocity 1 treatments, the results are weaker 
though some statistically significant effects are still identified specially for small firms.   
(1) (2) (3)
Balance/Sales Balance/Sales Balance/Sales
VARIABLES All firms Sales<4.700$ 4.700$<Sales
Reciprocity 2*30th May -0.003 -0.005 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 2*15th June -0.003 -0.005 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 2*30th June -0.005 -0.011 0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 2*15th July -0.004 -0.009 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 2*30th July -0.012 -0.028 0.005
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Reciprocity 2*15th August -0.012 -0.028 0.005
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Reciprocity 2*30th August -0.004 -0.009 0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Reciprocity 2*15th Sept. -0.002 -0.004 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Reciprocity 2*30th Sept. -0.005 -0.011 0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 45,946 23,615 22,331
R-squared 0.466 0.465 0.510
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






VARIABLES All firms Sales<4.700$ 4.700$<Sales
Tax morale*30th May -0.002 -0.005 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Tax morale*15th June -0.002 -0.005 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Tax morale*30th June -0.006 -0.014* 0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Tax morale*15th July -0.006 -0.014* 0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Tax morale*30th July -0.012 -0.022 -0.001
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
Tax morale*15th August -0.012 -0.022 -0.001
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
Tax morale*30th August -0.005 -0.011 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Tax morale*15th Sept. -0.002 -0.006 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tax morale*30th Sept. -0.006 -0.014* 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 45,946 23,615 22,331
R-squared 0.466 0.465 0.510
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Overall these findings seem to provide support for both the deterrence and reciprocity 
hypotheses on tax compliance.  Thus, both improving enforcement and making a better 
connection between taxes and quantity and quality of public service delivery could help 
to enhance tax collection. The fact that both, the letter stressing redistributive programs 
and that one that simple states that paying taxes is the right thing to do imply much 
weaker effects in terms of actual tax compliance suggests that within the all possible tax 
moral arguments the ones that matters the most are those that stress a reciprocal behavior 
of the state providing public gods and services.  
 
Secondly, the fact that the placebo letter has also a significant but very small impact 
suggest the result we obtained are not driven by the simple fact that the tax payers fills 
that the tax agency has somehow identify him (so he may be subject to audits or controls 




VARIABLES All firms Sales<4.700$ 4.700$<Sales
Placebo*30th May -0.003 -0.005 -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Placebo*15th June -0.003 -0.005 -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Placebo*30th June -0.007* -0.013* -0.001*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Placebo*15th July -0.007* -0.013* -0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Placebo*30th July -0.016* -0.031 -0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Placebo*15th August -0.016* -0.031 -0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Placebo*30th August -0.007* -0.012* -0.001*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Placebo*15th Sept. -0.004* -0.006 -0.001*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Placebo*30th Sept. -0.008* -0.014* -0.001*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 45,946 23,615 22,331
R-squared 0.466 0.465 0.510
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5. Placebo 
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4. Concluding remarks. 
 
In this paper we provide experimental evidence regarding two alternative forces 
explaining tax compliance: enforcement and moral suasion. The first type of determinant 
is related with the perception of tax payers about being audited and receiving fines and 
other punishments in case they are found in an irregular situation. The second factor is 
associated with appealing to citizen’s responsibility and awareness that taxes play a key 
role in financing public goods and other services.  Applying a controlled field experiment 
for the case of a local business tax in the municipality of Sucre in Venezuela, we find 
evidence that both factors could play a significant role in improving tax compliance.   
Though we are not the first to employ a field experiment to analyze the determinants of 
tax evasion, very few studies investigate the case of business taxes in developing 
countries. Moreover, within the reciprocity hypothesis we find that social services aiming 
at helping the poor seem not to play a significant role in increasing tax payments. This is 
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Appendix A: Treatment letters.  
A.1 Enforcement           
 Caracas, 2 de Mayo de 2011 
SRES. CENTRO FERRETERO EL PICO C.A. 
CARRETERA PETARE – SANTA LUCIA, KM. 9  
SECTOR CABEZA DE TIGRE, FILAS DE MARICHE  
 
Estimado contribuyente, 
Nos complace saludarle en nombre de nuestro alcalde Carlos Ocariz, 
En el camino transitado durante estos dos años de gestión nuestros contribuyentes se han convertido en un 
aliado incondicional y en una pieza fundamental para elevar la calidad de vida de los vecinos. Es por ello 
que, con miras a seguir respondiendo a las necesidaes de las comunidades, la Alcaldía de Sucre ha 
desarrollado una nueva estrategia para fortalecer esta alianza y estrechar aún más la relación con nuestros 
contribuyentes, mejorando los sistemas de fiscalización y recaudación tributaria en todo el Municipio. 
El objetivo principal de este Plan Estratégico es acercar el proceso de recaudación a nuestros 
contribuyentes y hacerlo cada vez más cómodo, efectivo y transparente, lo que se traduce en un sistema 
adecuado de control y seguimiento de todas las áreas, acceso a información completa y oportuna sobre los 
contribuyentes y los procesos, además de un buen clima organizacional, que redundará también en una 
mejor relación con el contribuyente.  
El éxito del Plan se apoya en la modernización de la Dirección de Rentas Municipales, con la 
incorporación de nuevos fiscales a través de consurco público, un sistema de control sobre sus labores 
totalmente renovado. Además, se implementará un novedoso sistema de información que facilitará la 
identificación de los contribuyentes y permitirá el seguimiento de sus estados de cuenta con la Alcaldía. 
Por otra parte, lograremos una movilización más efectiva de nuestros fiscales y proveedores a través de la 
renovación de nuestra flota de vehículos y motos. 
En definitiva, se trata de brindar una atención personalizada y de primer mundo a cada uno de nuestros 
contribuyentes, es lo que hemos venido haciendo, por ello trasladamos la sede de la Dirección de Rentas 
Municipales al Centro Cívico Plaza Miranda (al lado del Centro Comercial Millenium) con el fin de 
ofrecer un espacio más cómodo para que los contribuyentes puedan realizar sus pagos, consultas o 
reclamos de la manera más rápida y efectiva posible.  
Agradecidos por su atención y esperando que este año sea exitoso para su empresa, nos permitimos 
recordarle que puede hacer su pago con efectivo, cheque del mismo banco o cheque de gerencia a nombre 
de Alcaldía del Municipio Sucre (solo en instituciones bancarias), o en nuestras oficinas con tarjeta de 
crédito y débito de cualquier banco. Estamos a su entera disposición a través de los servicios de atención 
al ciudadano (0800-MISUCRE/08006478273) y a través de nuestra página web: 
www.alcaldiamunicipiosucre.gov.ve 
Confiados en que seguiremos siendo aliados por el progreso y la seguridad ciudadana de nuestro 
Municipio,  
Cordialmente, 
Dra. María Lapi 
Directora de Rentas Municipales 
Alcaldía del Municipio Sucre del Estado Miranda 
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A.2 Reciprocity 1 
 Sres.  CENTRO FERRETERO EL PICO C.A. 
CARRETERA PETARE – SANTA LUCIA, KM. 9  
SECTOR CABEZA DE TIGRE, FILAS DE MARICHE  
Ciudad.- 
Estimado contribuyente, 
Nos complace saludarle en nombre de nuestro alcalde Carlos Ocariz, 
En el camino transitado durante estos dos años de gestión nuestros contribuyentes se han convertido en un 
aliado incondicional y en una pieza fundamental para elevar la calidad de vida de los vecinos. Con su 
apoyo, hemos logrado avances importantes en materia de seguridad, limpieza, movilidad, obras y 
recuperación de espacios públicos.  
Nuestro objetivo ha sido siempre contribuir en mejorar la convivencia y lograr un clima favorable para el 
desarrollo de la actividad económica del Municpio Sucre. Por ello, a través de nuestro Plan Integral de 
Seguridad Ciudadana, hemos logrado reducir los índices de homicidios en casi 30%;  mientras en el resto 
del esta cifra sube, en nuestro Muncipio baja.  
Esta efectiva política de seguridad ha sido exitosa gracias al trabajo mancomunado con la empresa 
privada, su aporte nos ha permitido llevar a cabo acciones concretas en nuestra lucha contra la 
inseguridad. Juntos hemos logrado superar los obstáculos y hoy contamos con la policía mejor pagada y 
mejor dotada del país, aumentamos el número de funcionarios a más de 1.200; formamos 33 nuevos 
policías de circulación,  elevando a 180 el número de oficiales; renovamos  nuestras unidades con 128 
motocicletas y 123 patrullas. Asimismo, creamos el programa Policías de Contacto en las urbanizaciones 
La Carlota, Campo Claro, Santa Cecilia, Los Ruices y el barrio José Félix Ribas. Habilitamos el Centro 
de Atención Telefónica y somos la única policía de Venezuela con un moderno sistema de monitoreo 
satelital. 
Para nosotros la inseguiridad no solo se combate con más y mejores policías, la creación de espacios para 
el ciudadano y el incentivo de la cultura, la educación y el deporte, son también elementos fundamentales 
en nuestro Plan Integral, por ello implementamos medidas como la construcción de 20 autopistas 
populares, recuperación de canchas y espacios deportivos, la rehabilitación de zonas urbanas, el 
alumbrado público, la transformación de La Redoma de Petare, la organización de los mercados 
populares, el control del comercio informal, la rehabilitación de las escuelas municipales, el aumento de 
la flota de camiones de basura, la instalación de más de 2500 papeleras en todo el Municipio, y la puesta 
en marcha de programas de educación vial creativos como Para, Mira y Cruza. Todo esto ha sido posible 
gracias al apoyo de nuestros contribuyentes. Es mucho lo que hemos logrado, pero no estamos conformes, 
sabemos que todavía falta camino por recorrer.  
Agradecidos por su atención y esperando que este año sea exitoso para su empresa, nos permitimos 
recordarle que el pago puntual de su compromiso tributario, es clave para nuestra gestión. Puede hacer su 
pago con efectivo, cheque del mismo banco o cheque de gerencia a nombre de Alcaldía del Municipio 
Sucre (solo en instituciones bancarias), o en nuestras oficinas con tarjeta de crédito y débito de cualquier 
banco. Estamos a su entera disposición a través de los servicios de atención al ciudadano (0800-
MISUCRE/08006478273) y a través de nuestra página web: www.alcaldiamunicipiosucre.gov.ve 
Confiados en que seguiremos siendo aliados por el progreso y la seguridad ciudadana de nuestro 
Municipio,  
 Se despide cordialmente,                           Dra. María Lapi 
Directora de Rentas Municipales 
Alcaldía del municipio Sucre del Estado Miranda 
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A.3 Reciprocity 2 
Sres. CENTRO FERRETERO EL PICO C.A. 
Estimado contribuyente, 
Nos complace saludarle en nombre de nuestro alcalde Carlos Ocariz, 
En el camino transitado durante estos dos años de gestión nuestros contribuyentes se han convertido en un aliado 
incondicional y en una pieza fundamental para elevar la calidad de vida de los vecinos. Su aporte nos ha permitido 
atender las necesidades  básicas de los más vulnerables de nuestro municipio: niños, madres, personas de la tercera 
edad y familias en pobreza extrema, a través del Plan Progresa. 
En el municipio Sucre viven alrededor un millón de habitantes, de ellos el 60% se concentra en la parroquia de 
Petare, el 25% entre la Dolorita, Caucagüita y Filas de Mariche y, aproximadamente, el 12% en la parroquia Leoncio 
Martínez. Es por ello, que en nuestras prioridadades está brindarle a la población más necesitada, con el apoyo de 
la empresa privada, oportunidades de educación, salud, nutrición, recreación y trabajo. 
Miles de sucrenses se han visto beneficiados con los 13 programas sociales del Plan Progresa. Más de 7.000 niños 
reciben una transferencia mensual en efectivo si asisten al 85% de las clases, a través de Estudia y Progresa; 
diariamente 5.000 niños de preescolar y primaria reciben se merienda con el programa Aliméntate y Progresa. De 
igual manera, con Equípate y Progresa 16.757 niños fueron dotados con morrales y útiles escolares; además, se ha 
recuperado la infraestructura de las escuelas municipales y se ha hecho entrega de 1.498 nuevos pupitres. 
Recientemente, activamos el programa social Supérate y Progresa que otorgó 80 becas para que jóvenes de Petare 
puedan cursar sus estudios universitarios. 
El trabajo mancomunado con nuestros contribuyentes también nos ha permitido crear espacios para la atención, 
recreación y esparcimiento de niños, jóvenes y tercera edad. Ya hemos construido 10 Clubes de Abuelos que han 
beneficiado a más de 600 personas de la llamada juventud prolongada; En nuestros 50 Hogares para Crecer han 
sido albergados 1.769 niños;  63 familias en situación de pobreza extrema han sido atendidas de forma integral  a 
través del programa Progresemos. En Sucre tenemos también un compromiso con el deporte, por ello, a través de 
Juega y Progresa ya hemos construido 105 canchas populares y 20 de usos múltiples. 
La red de salud primaria muestra otro resultado positivo de la dupla entre el sector empresarial y la Alcaldía. Hemos 
atendido más de 1.949 consultas prenatales y ecosonogramas con Contrólate y Progresa; el programa Chequéate y 
Progresa ha permitido 2.710 consultas a los pacientes con hipertensión. Sin duda alguna, el logro de mayor impacto 
social ha sido la reestructuración del Hospital Pérez de León, donde incrementamos significativamente los 
parámetros de atención hospitalaria, aumentamos en 90% la atención de emergencias de adultos y en 250% la de 
emergencias pediátricas.  
El Municipio Sucre se ha convertido en territorio promotor del desarrollo económico, por ello, trabajamos 
incansablemente porque nuestros habitantes tengan oportunidades de progresar. A través de las Ferias de Empleo 
creamos espacios para que los sucrenses y vecinos del área metropolitana puedan relacionarse directamente con 
las opciones laborales que ofrece la empresa privada; más 40.000 personas han asistido a las Ferias de Empleo de 
Sucre y 2.500 han sido ubicado en puestos de trabajo gracias a ello. De igual forma, hemos brindado capacitación a 
más de 1.200 comerciantes y promotores de Mercados Populares a través de 16 talleres  de formación. 
Es mucho lo que hemos logrado y estamos seguros que juntos conquistaremos mayores logros en pro del 
crecimiento de nuestro Municipio. 
Agradecidos por su atención y esperando que este año sea exitoso para su empresa, nos permitimos recordarle que 
el pago puntual de su compromiso tributario, es clave para nuestra gestión. Puede hacer su pago con efectivo, 
cheque del mismo banco o cheque de gerencia a nombre de Alcaldía del Municipio Sucre (solo en instituciones 
bancarias), o en nuestras oficinas con tarjeta de crédito y débito de cualquier banco. Estamos a su entera 
disposición a través de los servicios de atención al ciudadano (0800-MISUCRE/08006478273) y a través de nuestra 
página web: www.alcaldiamunicipiosucre.gov.ve 
Confiados en que seguiremos siendo aliados por el progreso y la seguridad ciudadana de nuestro Municipio,  Se 
despide cordialmente,                                         
Dra. María Lapi, Directora de Rentas Municipales,  Alcaldía del muncipio Sucre del Estado Miranda 
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A.4 Tax Morale 
Sres.  
CENTRO FERRETERO EL PICO C.A. 
CARRETERA PETARE – SANTA LUCIA, KM. 9  
SECTOR CABEZA DE TIGRE, FILAS DE MARICHE  
Ciudad.- 
Estimado contribuyente, 
Nos complace saludarle en nombre de nuestro alcalde Carlos Ocariz, 
En el camino transitado durante estos dos años de gestión nuestros contribuyentes se han convertido en un 
aliado incondicional y en una pieza fundamental para elevar la calidad de vida de los vecinos. En nuestro 
municipio, gracias al compromiso de la comunidad de empresarios de Sucre, logramos un incremento en 
la recaudación de 59% entre el año 2008 y 2009, y de 22% entre el 2009 y 2010. 
Hoy en día, más del 60% de los ingresos tributarios provienen del pago de los impuestos sobre 
actividades económicas, de industria, comercio, servicios o de índole similar. Aplaudimos y nos llena de 
satisfacción el espírito de responsabilidad y compromiso que han demostrado nuestros contribuyentes con 
los principios de moralidad ciudadana, pues nos ha permitido diseñar e implemetar planes y programas 
para el progreso y crecimiento del Municipio Sucre, respondiendo así a las demandas de las comunidades.  
Estamos seguros que vamos a seguir creciendo y que está alianza cada día se va a fortalecer más. Con su 
apoyo, año tras año seguiremos siendo más exitosos en la recaudación de nuestros impuestos tributarios. 
Es mucho lo que hemos logrado, pero no estamos conformes, sabemos que todavía falta camino por 
recorrer, juntos haremos del Municipio Sucre una referencia nacional de recaudación e inversión eficiente 
de recursos.  
Agradecidos por su atención y esperando que este año sea exitoso para su empresa, nos permitimos 
recordarle que el pago puntual de su compromiso tributario, es clave para nuestra gestión. Puede hacer su 
pago con efectivo, cheque del mismo banco o cheque de gerencia a nombre de Alcaldía del Municipio 
Sucre (solo en instituciones bancarias), o en nuestras oficinas con tarjeta de crédito y débito de cualquier 
banco. Estamos a su entera disposición a través de los servicios de atención al ciudadano (0800-
MISUCRE/08006478273) y a través de nuestra página web: www.alcaldiamunicipiosucre.gov.ve 
Confiados en que seguiremos siendo aliados por el progreso y la seguridad ciudadana de nuestro 
Municipio,  
 Se despide cordialmente, 
 
Dra. María Lapi 
Directora de Rentas Municipales 






      Caracas, 2 de Mayo de 2011 
Sres.  
CENTRO FERRETERO EL PICO C.A. 
CARRETERA PETARE – SANTA LUCIA, KM. 9  




Nos complace saludarle en nombre de nuestro alcalde Carlos Ocariz, 
La presente es para comunicarle que podrá ubicar la nueva oficina de la Dirección de Rentas Municipales, 
en la siguiente dirección: 
 Av. Francisco de Miranda. Centro Cívico Plaza Miranda, Nivel Planta Baja, al lado de la 
entrada al estacionamiento de Centro Comercial Millenium Mall y Frente al Museo de 
Transporte. Telf.:  (212) 808-6906  
La anterior oficina ubicada en el Edif. Centro Prestigio Giorgio, Piso 1, Boleíta Sur, no continuara 
prestando servicios a los contribuyentes. 
Agradecidos por su atención y esperando que este año sea exitoso para su empresa, nos permitimos 
recordarle que el pago puntual de su compromiso tributario, es clave para nuestra gestión. Puede hacer su 
pago con efectivo, cheque del mismo banco o cheque de gerencia a nombre de Alcaldía del Municipio 
Sucre (solo en instituciones bancarias), o en nuestras oficinas con tarjeta de crédito y débito de cualquier 
banco. Estamos a su entera disposición a través de los servicios de atención al ciudadano (0800-
MISUCRE/08006478273) y a través de nuestra página web: www.alcaldiamunicipiosucre.gov.ve 
 




Dra. María Lapi 
Directora de Rentas Municipales 
Alcaldía del municipio Sucre del Estado Miranda 
 
 
 
 
